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INTRODUCTION 
It seems to have become somewhat fashionable to abandon the idea of inherent “trade- 
offs” within manufacturing strategy which were first discussed in detail by Skinner 
[1],[2], in favour of “The World Class Strategy”. This view has of course been most 
strongly espoused by Schonberger [3], [4] who has even refrained from using the term 
other than in the rather evocative “T-word” form. It would seem regrettable that little 
real research evidence has ever been offered in support of the wholesale abandonment 
of trade-off models other than in the form of case anecdotes almost universally taken 
from high volume, repetitive manufacturing engineering products. We attempt here to 
provide a rather more balanced analysis of this apparent dichotomy m the hope of 
providing a rational model for future investigation. 
THE WORLD CLASS MANUFACTURING MODEL 
The world class manufacturing model is perhaps best summed up by Schonberger’s own 
19 points [4] as shown in Figure 1. Although individual elements of this list might be 
questioned in terms of how they might relate to specific industries (for example the 
pursuit of item 18 in certain capital intensive industries) as a general list it is difficult to 
challenge such statements of obvious good sense. 
The Cranfield Competitive Edge Manufacturing model [5] has identified what these 
often mean in terms of a challenge to transform the main performance characteristics of 
manufacturing systems (see Figure 2) through six fundamental objectives for step 
changes: 
1. Reduce inventory investment by 50% or more across raw materials, work in 
process and finished goods stock. 
3 -. Reduce manufacturing lead times by 50% or more: there is. of course a one-for- 
one correspondence of lead time with WIP inventory so this goes hand-m-hand 
with (1). 
3. In order to compete in world markets it will be necessary to move to a much 
faster rate of product innovation with two or three times the current rate of 
innovation and at the same time to do this on development lead times which are 
only half those currently available. 
4/j. Reducing the overall cost base by 30% or more must largely be achieved by 
reducing the ‘support’ or facilitating labour - the hangers on (e.g. expedltors, co- 
* ordinators, materials movement, cleaners, etc.) - by 50%. 
Finally, while doing all of this companies must move to thinking in terms of Parts per 
Million defectives m the manufacturing process. 1% sounds good until you see it as 
10,000 PPM. 
One thing is clear and that is that you cannot expect to get such fundamental changes 
from tinkering with the existing manufacturing system - getting a 2% benefit here and a 
3% benefit there. The only way to achieve this sort of step change is to think in terms of 
throwing the whole manufacturing system up in the air and making it land in a 
completely different way. 
Viewed as a historical progression over the last 30 years (figure 3) there has been a 
major shift of emphasis in 3 key areas of manufacturing systems: inventory, quality and 
automation. 
Inventory 
Quality 
flexibility. 
When we ask what is different about the 1990’s and the 21st Century i 
eliminate the causes of inventory 
eliminate the causes of quality problems 
and grow flexibility 
do not disappear. What we add to these, however, is putting in place the “Learning 
Organisation”. That is, to understand that the world 1s changing in ways which we 
cannot predict and that the essence of future success lies in having an organisation 
which can self change and self imnrove continuously. this is rather more than 
Schonberger’s prescription for continuous improvement alone (Figure 1. item 3) which 
actually has a very limited horizon: there 1s little call for even the most efficiently 
produced slide-rules and bakelite mouldings. 
THE CRANFIELD MANUFACTURING STRATEGY MODEL 
(INCLUDING STRATEGIC TRADE-OFFS) I i 
The initial version of the Cranfield Manufacturing Strategy model was first presented in 1 
New 1979 [6] and the development of the seven key Competitive Edge Criteria followed1 
. in New and Sweeney (1984) [7] and in its current form is represented in Figure 4 (from 
PI). 
We translate the question “What do you sincerely want to be good at” into the question 
“what could we try to be good at”. We call these the competitive edge criteria. 
A company must choose an appropriate set of competitive edge criteria - those things it 
plans to compete on. It does this against a background of the corporate strategy? the 
environmental pressures which act upon it, the characteristics of the market in which it 
operates and of course the strategies of the major competitors. This is the subject ol 
corporate strategic analysis and is not our prime concern here. The important point i: 
that a company must decide onerationallv how it is going to compete m a market ant 
then translate that into appropriate marketing and manufacturing strategies. 
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The Competitive Edge Criteria are: 
DELIVERY 
Lead Time 
m The time the customer must wait between order placement and 
receipt. 
3 Policv Tvpes 
m Make-for stock 
Customer lead time expected to be zero 
n Make-to-Order 
Customer lead time 
= total manufacturing lead time + backlog 
n Assemble to Order 
Customer lead time 
=part manufacturing lead time + backlog 
Reliabilitv 
How reliable the company is in delivering a customer’s order on or 
before the quoted delivery date. 
2 Policv Tvues 
8 Make-for-stock 
Reliability = Availability ex stock 
I 
Capability 
m Make/assemble-to-order 
Reliability is measured as 
lateness relative to promised 
delivery date 
I 
n The quality capability of a product is a measure of its relative 
‘usefulness’ to the customer. It includes product features which 
m ight differentiate it from competitive products, e.g. small size, 
weight, added functions etc. It may also include such features as 
after sales service. 
Consistency 
w Quality consistency is concerned with how well the product 
conforms to its specification. 
FLEXIBILITY 
Des&m 
n 
Volume 
w 
PRICE 
m 
Design flexibility is concerned with the ability to produce products 
to a customer specification, rather than supply from a standard 
range. 
Volume flexibility is concerned with the capability to supply 
customers with large variations in total demand without affecting 
the lead time. Variations may be seasonal. cyclic or random.We 
may be concerned with total volume flexibility or with mix 
flexibility within the total volume. 
The money price actually paid by the purchaser 
The money price may include both initial purchase cost and 
expected “lifetime” costs. 
Manufacturing strategy is primarily about what a single slant is capable of ,doing 
successfully - a “corporate” manufacturing strategy would cover only these items which 
would be common across all plants (not very much generally). 
When a company has decided which of the competitive edge criteria a plant is to 
compete on, this choice must be translated into an appropriate marketing strategy and a 
supporting marketing mix. This is often expressed in terms of the 4P’s of the marketing 
mix: 
Product: What you are going to sell 
Promotion: How you are going to sell it 
Price: How much you are going to charge for it 
and Place: How you are going to distribute it. 
It should also be translated into an appropriate manufacturing strategy and a supporting 
manufacturing mix. The dotted line in the model diagram indicates that this is rarely 
done in a coherent way. 
There are also 4P’s for the Manufacturing Mix: 
Plant: The physical location itself 
Process: The technology and flow organisation used 
People: The employment policies used 
and Product: The structure of the product in manufacturing terms 
In order to deliver successfully a particular set of competitive edge criteria in the 
market place a plant must use an appropriate manufacturing mix. No marketing 
director would consider using the same marketing, mix to sell:A standard product 
produced for sale ex-stock, As he would to sell: A customised high feature specia.1 
product on a short reliable lead time at a price premium. Yet often we see orders for 
both flung into the same manufacturing mix with the expectation that they can be made 
equally well. It is appropriate to ask “if you need a different marketing mix what makes 
you think you don’t need a different manufacturing mix?” 
When we examine many corporate strategy documents the manufacturing strategy (if 
you can find it) often runs something like this: 
Deliver on the shortest lead time, 
always on time 
A product with better features that the competition 
made perfectly 
to any design the customer wants, 
in any volume he wants, 
and by the way be the cheapest in 
the business!! 
This is not a statement of manufacturing strategy - more a set of pious incompatible 
hopes. Moreover there is no such thing as a non-decision in manufacturing strategy: 
make no mistake about it if you fail to set directions at the strategic level you ~11 leave 
the definition of the actual (resulting) manufacturing strategy by default to operators, 
purchase clerks and schedulers - who will of course make local decisions which are 
unlikely to form a single coherent strategy at all. 
Whenever the question of trading-off these competitive edge criteria arises the usual 
marketing response is: “Our business is different, in our business we need all the 
criteria”. Before we consider this let us note that there are actually two qualitatively 
different forms of competitive edge criteria. 
MARKET HYGIENE FACTORS (after HERZBERG) 
Hvgiene factors allow you to “play the game”. They will never win you.orders - though 
th& lose you orders very rapidly if you cannot meet them. For example m some markets 
ex-stock supply is essential - customers will not wait any time at all for delivery, while in 
other markets standard products are useless and product customisation is essential even 
to be considered as a supplier. 
COJIPETITIVE EDGE FACTORS 
Are those criteria on which you +I compete, such as product features or by offering 
shorter lead times than the competltlon. 
If you really &J have a market which requires all the criteria then presumably all you 
need to do is be at least as creative as the competition - after all they myst have the 
same problem. We should, however, ask what would hgppen in this market if one of the 
(probably small flexible) corn 
P 
etitors decided to compete on quality features and design 
flexibility on a short reliable ead time - concentrating on the up-market specials, while 
another competitor (probably large and dominant) decided to compete by producing 
cheap standard products sold ex-stock and leave the specials to someone else. 
Would the company sitting on the fence real1 
Traditionally the manufacturing strategy model of r 
be able to compete with either? 
ers two solutions: 
Change the strategy, rank the criteria and focus the plant on specific 
criteria 
Use the marketing solution and segment the problem. PePegments may 
be managed by using different manufacturing mixes m different plants 
(the Focussed Plant approach) or by segmenting the plant itself using a 
PWP or Plant-within-a-Plant approach. 
In trying to assess its positioning against the market place a company must therefore ask 
three fundamental questions: 
1. 
i: 
What do the customers want? 
How does the company performance compare with the competition? 
Does it matter? 
In developing a manufacturing strategy we ask these questions in relation to the 
competitive edge criteria which we can influence through the manufacturing system 
(there are of course other factors such as distribution channels etc. which are not 
directly influenced by the manufacturing system). The basic proposition is that for 
ever-v manufacturing mission there is a corresponding manufacturing mix that will &@ 
in delivering the competitive edge criteria. But every manufacturing mix is a set of 
decisions about trade-offs and however good you get at minimising the effects of the 
trade offs they will not all go away. You can certainly get better at everything 
simultaneously but some trade offs particularly those associated with levels of 
customisation/standardisation will not go away. 
The levels of relative support which the manufacturing mix can offer have of course 
been discussed by Hayes and Wheelwright 1984 [8]. 
The iManufacturing Flexibility Model 
The third major research area which is relevant to this debate would appear to be that 
related to manufacturing flexibility. Slack[8] and Chambers[9] have discussed the role of 
flexibility in the context of manufacturing strategy. In particular Slack’s 
Range/Response dimensions model (Figure 5) is extremely useful in focussing attention 
on the four areas of flexibility identified: 
PRODUCT 
MIX 
VOLUME 
and DELIVERY 
and also in distinguishing between possible(technological?) range and the ease with 
which changes can be made (response flexibility). This model has, as can be seen by 
comparing the variables considered, a close affinity with the Cranfield Competitive 
Edge Criteria Model. 
World Class Manufacturing and the New Strategic Trade Offs 
In order to understand the real and potential impact of the so called World Class 
Manufacturing Model on the traditional trade-offs associated with the manufacturing 
strategy model we will consider some of the classic trade offs and the ways in which 
these have changed over time, while taking account of the manufacturing flexibility 
model. 
1. Lead Time v Delivery Reliability 
Conventional: In the make to order business, quoting a short lead time 
puts you at risk in achieving this lead time. 
New Wisdom: High process repeatability and low buffers can give short 
and reliable lead times 
2. Quality Capability v Quality Consistency 
Conventional: Very high quality/specification products are more difficult 
to make pro erly so consistency (conformance to 
specification 5 suffers accordingly. 
New Wisdom: Attaining high quality levels b more difficult but *quality 
consistency has become a market hygiene factor m most 
sophisticated markets (but see also 3 and 4 below) 
3. Quality Consistency v Price 
Conventional: Consistently good quality costs more to produce and 
deserves higher prices. 
New Wisdom: Quality consistency is a hygiene factor in most sophisticated 
markets and actually costs & in total 
4. Quality Capability v Price 
Conventional: High quality features (high specification) in a product costs 
more to produce. 
5. 
New Wisdom: BMW’s still cost more than SKODAS! 
Design Flexibility v Leadtime 
Conventional: Customised products can only be made to order on long 
lead times 
New Wisdom: Modular “mushroom” products allow very short response 
times but true customisation still takes longer to supply 
than an equivalent standard product 
6. Design Flexibility v Price 
Conventional: Customised products cost more to produce than similar 
specification standard products 
New Wisdom: Modularity can give high variant flexibility, but unique 
customisation is still more expensive to produce unless 
specificity is trivial. 
7. Lead Time v Volume Flexibility 
Conventional: If volume flexibility is low then lead times must vary in _ . . . . . 1 I 
the 
order to balance load and capactty in tne make to oraer 
business . 
New Wisdom: WCM type plants give greater volume flexibility which in 
general reduces the effect of this trade off significantly 
In general, while the pursuit of manufacturing flexibility in all its forms is obviously 
likely to be advantageous in any manufacturing system, there still remains the fact that a 
plant which produces a single product is capable of being more “efficient” than one 
which attempts to make 786 different variants. 
We have discussed here some of the most obvious single trade offs and these are 
summarised in Figure 6. A tentative conclusion from Figure 6 is that while several of 
the conventional trade offs have been eliminated there are just as many which remain 
while others have been affected in degree but not in substance. In particular we note 
that those trade offs which are concerned with 
QUALITY CAPABILITY 
and true DESIGN FLEXIBILITY 
are still highly relevant to the choices which companies make in relation to the most 
appropriate Manufacturing Mix for their Competitive Edge Criteria. 
The key manufacturing strategy issue of the Competitive Edge Criteria is “can you be 
the best in the world at all seven criteria simultaneously from the same manufacturing 
mix?“. We believe that the the answer to this question is still NO and that this is 
supported by the case examples (disguised to avoid embarassment to the companies 
concerned) summarised in Figure 7, and discussed briefly below: 
Babcock &Wilcox 
A familiar case in manufacturing strategy:the key trade off is Quality Capability v Price 
(via the cost structure) and the issue the cost of achieving the appropriate level.of 
technical quality. The achievement of nuclear quality standards is still more expensive 
than the achievement of standard pressure vessel standards. 
_ Vultichem Corporation 
A multinational chemical corporation asked its process/product engineers to build it 
the lowest unit cost plant in the world to produce a certain type of plastic. Two and a 
half years and $lOOOmillion later the plant was delivered to manufacturing: a 27 stage 
synthesis continuous process plant with a 60 day cycle time. They then discovered that 
they needed to make 70 different product variants! The only solutions? Limited range 
supply- not acceptable to the market, or run it with a different variant in each synthesis 
stage. They currently have the highest unit cost plant in the world for producing 70 
variants and are stuck with it for the next 20 years! 
Eurofoods 
Have had a 5 million pound high speed glass jar bottling line mothballed for the last 
four years because 6 months before product launch marketin 
product had to be sold in a composite pack not a glass jar. 
announced that the 
Un ortunately m order to f 
keep the capital cost down the installed line could not be used to pack other products as 
it did not have the required size flexibility. 
Electrocon Ltd. 
A producer of highly customised electronic connector products had just had a one 
hundred thousand pound capital equipment purchase authorised. by head office 
(justified on a unit cost reduction basis) before they realised that its mstallatlon would 
have completely ruined their high customisation/rapid response market strategy. The 
technology was totally inappropriate for their market place, though of course all the 
high volume low cost standard connector producers used the technology very 
successfully. Fortunately they had not actually ordered the machine. 
Food Coolers Inc 
A world leader in industrial cooling equi ment produces both standard climate control 
systems and highly customised systems or specific food manufacturing plants. Many iP 
components are common but because of the nature of the manifold connections which 
are required to achieve certain design characteristics it is impossible to use modular 
solutions. Moreover the custom portion is a critical manufacturing process which cannot 
be started in advance of the product specification. Custom coolers are more expensive 
and take longer to supply than standard coolers of an equivalent capacity. 
Cigo Filter International 
Cigo Filter manufacture a multitude of cigarette filters for world markets. They initially 
dismissed the manufacture of a polypropylene filter as too cheap and nasty for people to 
consider. Unfortunately a competitor undercut them dramatically on price in supplying 
the enormous Chinese market with a filter which was impossible to sell m western 
“sophisticated” markets. 
These case examples illustrate only a sample of the range of trade off decisions with 
which companies are faced. The World Class Strategy approach purports to claim that 
no such trade offs exist and that it would have been possible to solve the problem 
another way. However in the case of Cigo Filter for example it is a little difficult to see 
how; the company produces filters faster than anyone else in the world on the same 
machines that the competitors use with a raw materials cost of around 70%. 
Unfortunately for them polypropylene costs only about half of the cost of the normal 
raw material of the filter! 
We would suggest that it is time to stop indulging in emotive attacks on the T-word 
syndrome and return to a reasoned rational approach to the analysis of real 
manufacturing strategy issues. It is, moreover, appropriate to note t,hat Schonberger’s 
own arguments in relation to this issue have become at the very least confused not to 
sav totally inconsistent in [4]. In chapter 2 “Universal Strategy: The Shattering of 
Strategic Business Thought” we are invited to believe that: 
“World class(WC) business strategies may be reduced to a single set,applicable to all 
businesses”, I wonder what happened to competitive advantage? The author continues 
with the “myth of trade offs” and of course the “dreaded T-word”. However the same 
chapter simultaneously assumes “economies of scale” in manufacturing processes and 
recommends us to “rank, don’t trade”. We are left wondering exactly what the difference 
is. In chapter 3 we are further presented with the focus factory model and the example 
of Copeland Corporation’s restructuring along classic manufacturing strategy lines. 
Presumably there are no trade offs to be made in choosing the appropriate Copeland 
manufacturing mixes. 3 Perhaps it would be a good idea for journalists to stick to 
journalism rather than indulge in gross simplifications for the sake of sensationalism 
without any research basis. 
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General 
1. Get to know the next and final customer 
2. Get to know the competition 
3. Dedicate to continual. rapid improvement in quality. cost. response time. 
and flexibility 
Design and Organization 
4. Cut the number of components or operations and number of suppliers 
to a few good ones 
5. Cut the number of flow paths iwhere the work goes next) 
6. Organize product- or customer-focused linkages of resources 
Operations 
‘7. Cut flow time. flow distance, inventory, and space along the chain of 
customers. 
8. Cut setup. changeover, get-ready. and start-up time 
9. Operate at the customer’s rate of use (or a smoothed representation of 
it) 
Human Resource Development 
10. Develop human resources through cross-training (for mastery). continual 
education. job switching, and multivear cross-career reassignments 
11. Develop operator/team-owners of products. processes. and outcomes 
Quality and Problem-Solving 
12. Make it easier to produce or provide the product without error [total 
quality) 
13. Record and retain quality, process. and problem data at the workplace 
14. Assure that line people get first crack at problem-solving-before staff 
experts 
Accounting and Control 
15. Cut transactions and reporting: control causes not costs 
Capacity 
16. Maintain and improve present resources and human work before thinking 
about new equipment and automation 
17. AAutomate incrementally when process variability cannot otherwise be 
reduced 
18. Seek to have plural instead of singular workstations. machines. and 
cells or flow lines for each product or customer family 
Marketing 
19. Market and sell your firm ’s capability and competence 
FIGURE I PRINCIPLES OF WORLD-CLASS, CUSTOMER 
DRIVEN PERFORMANCE 
Richard J. Schonberger “Building a Chain of Cktomers” [4] 
1. REDUCE INVENTORY INVESTMENT BY 50% OR MORE 
2. REDUCE MANUFACTURING LEAD TlMES BY 50% OR 
MORE 
MONTHS -> WEEKS 
WEEKS -> DAYS 
DAYS -> HOURS 
3. INTRODUCE NEW PRODUCTS AT TWO/THREE TIMES 
THE EXISTING RATE ON 50% OF THE CURRENT . 
DESIGN/DEVELOPMENT LEAD TIMES 
4. REDUCE COSTS BY 30% OR MORE 
5. REDUCE “SUPPORT” LABOUR BY 50% OR MORE 
6. IMPROVE QUALITY TO PARTS PER MlLL!ON 
1% = 10,000 PPM 
c f 
FIGURE 2 
THE CHALLENGE OF 
TRANSFORMATION: STEP IMPROVEMENTS 
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FIGURE 4 
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
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FIGURE 5: THE RANGE/RESPONSE 
FLEXIBILITY MODEL (SLACK) [9] 
TRADE OFF? TRADITIONAL NEW WISDOM 
LEAD TIME 
v 
DELIVERY RELIABILITY 
YES NO 
QUALITY CAPABILITY 
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PRICE 
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PRICE 
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FIGURE 6. TRADITIONAL AND NEW MANUFACTURING 
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FIGURE 7. CASE EXAMPLES: WORLD CLASS MANUFACTURING 
VERSUS STRATEGIC TRADE OFFS 
